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I. INTRODUCTION
The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA),' which took effect
on April 24, 1996, requires a sentencing court to order a defendant to make
restitution to victims of crimes for the full amount of their losses, without
consideration of the defendant's economic circumstances.2 On June 14,
2010, the Supreme Court of the United States rendered its decision in Dolan
* Assistant General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, J.D., University of Miami
School of Law, 2002. It is with warm sentiment that I express that this article be dedicated to
the late Professor John Arthur, whose teachings left an indelible mark on me, to this day.
Having taught for 30 years prior to his death, not only was he a highly respected professor of
philosophy at Binghamton University, State University of New York, he served for 18 years
as its Director of the Program in Philosophy, Politics, and Law. He is an immortal among
great minds and teachers.
+ WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, The Merchant of Venice, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
SHAKESPEARE, act 4, sc. 1, lines 121-122 (George Lyman Kittredge ed., 1936).
I. Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 204, 110 Stat.
1214, 1227-1241(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (2006).
2. Id. Its predecessor was the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA). See
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 5, 96 Stat. 1248, 1253.
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v. United States,3 deciding five to four, in favor of allowing MVRA restitu-
tion to be imposed, even after the expiration of 90 days, in federal criminal
cases.4 One might have expected to see a split of justices, along the lines of
the conservative wing against the liberal wing. That would result in a theo-
retical majority of Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito,
and Kennedy. The corresponding minority would have been Justices Breyer,
Stevens, Ginsberg, and Sotomayor. However, anyone harboring such expec-
tations would have been soundly disappointed, as the actual majority opinion
was written by Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Thomas, Ginsberg, Alito,
and Sotomayor.5 The dissenting opinion was written by Chief Justice Ro-
berts, joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy.6
The split represented a divergence in views that could not be easily re-
conciled by a simplistic rank and file orientation of ideology. Rather, the
conflict drew lines as to those members of the Court willing to impose a flex-
ible interpretation of the federal statute, versus those who refused to deviate
even an iota from the plain text. Another way to frame the divisions is be-
tween those who felt the statute removed restitution from the general rule of
sentencing finality, versus those who did not.
The MVRA, codified largely at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A and 3664, requires
the court, with few exceptions, to enter an order of restitution to the victims
of certain crimes.7 "If the law permits restitution, the probation officer must
conduct an investigation and submit a report [containing] sufficient informa-
tion for the court to order restitution."8 Section 3663A(a) provides, in perti-
nent part, that:
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when sentencing a
defendant convicted of an offense described in subsection (c), the
court shall order, in addition to, or in the case of a misdemeanor, in
addition to or in lieu of, any other penalty authorized by law, that
the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense ....
(2) For the purposes of this section, the term "victim" means a per-
son directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission
of an offense for which restitution may be ordered including, in the
case of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspira-
3. 130 S. Ct. 2533 (2010).
4. Id. at 2537.
5. Id. at 2536.
6. Id. at 2544.
7. See Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 204, 110
Stat. 1214, 1227-1241.
8. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(I)(B) (2009).
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cy, or pattern of criminal activity, any person directly harmed by
the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme [or]
conspiracy .... 9
Hence, because of the narrow definition of who constitutes a "victim,"
section 3663A(a)(1) does not authorize a court to order a defendant to pay
restitution to any person not a victim of the offense to which the defendant is
ultimately convicted of.1° However, should the parties so choose to enter
into a plea agreement, restitution may be ordered to be paid to persons other
than the victim of the offense."
Subsection (c)(3) also provides, however, that:
[t]his section shall not apply in the case of an offense described in
paragraph (1)(A)(ii) if the court finds, from facts on the record,
that-
(B) determining complex issues of fact related to the cause or
amount of the victim's losses would complicate or prolong the
sentencing process to a degree that the need to provide restitution
to any victim is outweighed by the burden on the sentencing
process.
12
The restitution order "shall be issued and enforced in accordance with
section 3664."' 3 The burden is on the government to identify the victims of
the defendant's offense. 4 Additionally, "The burden of demonstrating the
amount of the loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense shall be on
the attorney for the Government."'15 The sentencing court is required to "or-
der the probation officer to obtain and include in its presentence report, or in
a separate report, as the court may direct," among other things, "to the extent
practicable, a complete accounting of the losses to each victim.' ' 16 The pro-
bation officer must obtain victim information from the prosecuting attor-
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1)-(2).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Rand, 403 F.3d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Hughey v.
United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413 (1990), superseded by statute, Crime Control Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(3).
12. Id. § 3663A(c)(3).
13. Id. § 3663A(d).
14. See id. § 3664(d)(1), (e).
15. Id. § 3664(e).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a).
20111
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ney."7 The prosecuting attorney is required to consult with all identified vic-
tims and "promptly provide the probation officer with a listing of the
amounts subject to restitution.' ' 8
If it is clearly impracticable to satisfy or comply with this requirement,
the probation officer "shall so inform the court."' 9 If the victim's losses can-
not be determined by ten days before sentencing, "the attorney for the Gov-
ernment or the probation officer shall so inform the court," and the court
shall set a date for a final determination, the date of which is "not to exceed
90 days after sentencing., 20 The summary determination proceeding should
not constitute a full blown evidentiary hearing.2' A private settlement of an
involved or related amount will not bar restitution, but restitution must be
offset against the civil settlement amount.22 When determining restitution,
regardless of the defendant's financial circumstances, section 3664 provides
that the court "shall order restitution to each victim in the full amount of each
victim's losses as determined by the court.
23
Criminal restitution under the MVRA differs from other forms of sen-
tencing, particularly in that, judges-not juries-make factual determinations
as to the amounts imposed. 24 Many unsuccessful defendants have brought
challenges that determinations of this nature, as opposed to those based on
findings by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or on the defendants' own ad-
missions, violate Sixth Amendment principles as spelled out in Blakely v.
17. Id. § 3664(d)(1).
18. Id.
19. Id. § 3664(a).
20. Id. § 3664(d)(5).
21. S. REP. No. 104-179, at 20 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 933. ('The
committee is concerned that without this clarification, the restitution phase of the sentencing
process could devolve into a full-scale evidentiary hearing. The committee believes that such
a development would be contrary to the interests of the swift administration of justice.").
22. United States v. Gallant, 537 F.3d 1202, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States
v. Harmon, 156 Fed. App'x 674, 676 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (court shall reduce restitu-
tion award under the MVRA by civil settlement amount); United States v. Doe, 374 F.3d 851,
856 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Bright, 353 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004))
("Where victims covered by a restitution order later recover 'compensatory damages' in a
civil proceeding for the same loss, the restitution order is accordingly reduced.").
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(I)(A).
24. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 53 n.14 (1986) (citing Bonnie Arnett Von Roed-
er, Note, The Right to a Jury Trial to Determine Restitution Under the Victim and Witness
Protection Act of 1982, 63 TEX. L. REV. 671, 684-85 (1984) ("Under [the federal Victim and
Witness Protection Act], defendants have no right to jury trial as to the amount of restitution,
even though the Seventh Amendment would require such a trial if the issue were decided in a
civil case.").
[Vol. 35
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Washington.2 ' Further, considering the Supreme Court's 2005 holding in
United States v. Booker,26 there have been a number of arguments brought to
the courts calling for the application of Booker to orders of restitution.27 The
gist of these arguments is that entering restitution orders solely based on
judicial findings constitutes sentencing error violating the Sixth Amendment,
as enunciated in Apprendi v. New Jersey,2s the predecessor to Blakely and
Booker.
One circuit court of appeals in the decision of United States v. George,29
which rejected such an Apprendi-Blakely-Booker challenge to the process of
a bench determination of restitution, described criminal restitution as "a civil
remedy administered for convenience by courts that have entered criminal
convictions. Other courts of appeal have similarly observed that there is
no Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial,31 likewise describing criminal resti-
tution as either being civil or not constituting criminal punishment.32 How-
ever, these opinions would appear to be treating wording to the contrary in
Pasquantino v. United States33 as dicta, in so doing. The Supreme Court of
the United States opined, "The purpose of awarding restitution . . . [is] to
mete out appropriate criminal punishment for that conduct. ' ' 34 Nonetheless,
the circuit courts of appeal have uniformly decided that there is no right to a
jury trial, not only in restitution proceedings under the MVRA, but also un-
der other similar restitution statutes.35
25. 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 491-97
(2000)).
26. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
27. See e.g., United States v. King, 414 F.3d 1329, 1330 n.l (11th Cir. 2005) (per cu-
riam) (citing United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2005)) ("Every circuit that
has addressed this issue directly has held that Blakely and Booker do not apply to restitution
orders.").
28. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
29. 403 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2005).
30. Id. at 473 (citing United States v. Bach, 172 F.3d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531, 542 (7th Cir. 1998)).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law
.... "1).
32. United States v. Visinaiz, 428 F.3d 1300, 1316 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding restitution is
not criminal punishment for purposes of the Sixth Amendment); United States v. Carruth, 418
F.3d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 2005) ("[l]t is essentially a civil remedy created by Congress and
incorporated into criminal proceedings for reasons of economy and practicality.").
33. 544 U.S. 349 (2005).
34. Id. at 365.
35. United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 260 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding a criminal
defendant statutorily required to pay restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 1593 for peonage, slavery,
2011]
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Moreover, the degree of proof in MVRA criminal restitution is less than
for a criminal conviction; the latter requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, whereas the former does not.36 Like the degree of proof in a civil mat-
ter, "[t]he burden is on the government to prove the amount of restitution
based on a preponderance of the evidence. 37  Such a standard has been
summarized, as when the finder of fact believes it is more probable that a
fact exists, than the fact not existing. 38 If an order of a district court deter-
mining the amount of restitution is challenged on appeal, the standard is
whether the determination amounts to clear error.39 Although one could ar-
gue that an order to pay restitution is a financial burden constituting a re-
straint on liberty, restitution has no effect on a defendant's custody status,
and courts have not permitted the use of the writ of habeas corpus to chal-
lenge a restitution order.n°
Additionally, even in cases where restitution under the MVRA was im-
posed, where the crime had been committed under prior versions of the fed-
eral statute, such impositions did not violate the Ex Post Facto clause of the
Constitution because restitution did not constitute criminal punishment.4
Despite the mandatory nature of this restitution, and the financial burden it
imposes on defendants, MyRA restitution is not considered "cruel and un-
usual punishment" and does not violate the Eighth Amendment of the Con-
42
stitution.
or trafficking in humans is not entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment on the
amount of restitution due).
Suffice it to say that the issue of whether an employer has a Seventh Amendment right to a
jury in a civil case in which an employee or the government is seeking back pay and liquidated
damages is analytically distinct from the question whether a criminal defendant who is re-
quired by statute to pay restitution is entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment on the
amount of restitution due. This court has already held that the answer to the latter question is
"no" in the context of awards made pursuant to other restitution statutes.
Id. (citing United States v. Tin Yat Chin, 476 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 2007)).
36. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 98 n.2 (1986).
37. United States v. DeRosier, 501 F.3d 888, 896 (8th Cir. 2007).
38. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
39. United States v. Statman, 604 F.3d 529, 535 (8th Cir. 2010).
40. See, e.g., Amaiz v. Warden, Fed. Satellite Low, 594 F.3d 1326, 1329-30 (11 th Cir.
2010) (per curiam); see also Mamone v. United States, 559 F.3d 1209, 1211 (11 th Cir. 2009)
(per curiam) (holding that a section 2255 motion could not be used to collaterally attack a
noncustodial part of a sentence like restitution).
41. United States v. Wells, 177 F.3d 603, 610 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Nichols,
169 F.3d 1255, 1280 (10th Cir. 1999).
42. United States v. Arledge, 553 F.3d 881, 899-900 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 342
(4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Williams, 128 F.3d 1239, 1242 (8th Cir. 1997).
[Vol. 35
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This article will initially focus on the development of the concept of res-
titution historically, leading to the eventual development Federal Probation
Act of 1925. The next part of this article will explain the changes in the law
of restitution with the enacting of the VWPA and the subsequent MVRA.
The fourth part will describe the course of the Dolan v. United States43 ap-
peal, the majority decision, and the dissent. Then in the fifth and final part,
the article will explore the effect of the case outcome, and any potential fu-
ture implications.
II. THE HISTORY OF CRIMINAL RESTITUTION AND THE FEDERAL
PROBATION ACT OF 1925
Criminal restitution, which focuses on the recovery of losses attributa-
ble to criminal conduct, dates as far back as biblical times, if not further. 44 In
fact, the rules given in these times "resulted in one of the first moral statutes
of criminal restitution.,, 45 These rules additionally served to appease the vic-
tim and helped to prevent retaliation by the victim or victim's family against
the criminal defendant.46  Biblical traditionalists for centuries embraced "a
premodern notion of natural law molded by Biblical scripture and Judeo-
Christian doctrine.' 47 Under the traditionalist approach, restitution was very
43. 130 S. Ct. 2533 (2010).
44. See Leviticus 6:1-5 (NIV). The following appears in the Book of Leviticus:
The LORD said to Moses: "If anyone sins and is unfaithful to the LORD by deceiving his
neighbor about something entrusted to him or left in his care or stolen, or if he cheats him, or if
he finds lost property and lies about it, or if he swears falsely, or if he commits any such sin
that people may do-when he thus sins and becomes guilty, he must return what he has stolen
or taken by extortion, or what was entrusted to him, or the lost property he found, or whatever
it was he swore falsely about. He must make restitution in full, add a fifth of the value to it
and give it all to the owner on the day he presents his guilt offering."
Id. (internal cross references omitted).
45. Lionel M. Lavenue, The Corporation as a Criminal Defendant and Restitution as a
Criminal Remedy: Application of the Victim and Witness Protection Act by the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines for Organizations, 18 J. CORP. L. 441, 514 (1993).
46. See generally Thomas M. Kelly, Note, Where Offenders Pay for Their Crimes: Vic-
tim Restitution and Its Constitutionality, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 685, 686-90 (1984) [herei-
nafter Victim Restitution and Its Constitutionality].
The harsh and destructive blood-feud eventually gave way to a process known as composition,
with the offending group paying the victim pursuant to an agreement produced by negotiations
between the two groups. The advent of economic stability has been credited with spanning the
transition from blood-feud to composition. The system of composition, said to have begun in
the Middle Ages primarily in Germanic areas, marked the beginning of restitution in a proper
sense, that is, as being closely related to the concept of punishment.
Id.
47. Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 33 (2006);
see also 2 THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 174 (Fathers of the English
2011]
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closely intertwined with retribution because by paying for one's crime, "the
suffering experienced via the infliction of criminal punishment acts as a pen-
ance which helps the wrongdoer atone for his or her crime, thereby becoming
morally reformed." 48 With time, however, secular philosophy would come
to replace religion; as religions clashed, the safer course, was to isolate mo-
rality from the plurality of belief systems:
In Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity, Stephen
Toulmin argues that the Enlightenment (usually seen as the begin-
ning of Modernity) had two beginnings. The Renaissance human-
ists from Erasmus on, who are too often ignored, constituted the
first beginning. He characterizes the humanists as embracing a
more modest understanding of reason (thought and conduct must
be reasonable rather than certain) that is more tolerant of "social,
cultural, and intellectual diversity." The seventeenth century ra-
tionalists constituted the second beginning of the Enlightenment as
a "Quest for Certainty." Contrary to conventional accounts of ra-
tionalists as engaged in pure abstract thought, Toulmin maintains
that the rationalist theories of 17th-century philosophers were "a
timely response to a specific historical challenge-the political,
social, and theological chaos embodied in the Thirty Years' War."
For example, Ren6 Descartes gave up on the modest skepticism of
the 16th century humanists and attempted to provide "clear, dis-
tinct, and certain" foundations for knowledge that provided "a new
way of establishing ... central truths and ideas: one that was in-
dependent of, and neutral between, particular religious loyalties."
Similarly, Grotius "reorganized the general rules of practical law
into a system whose principles were the counterparts of Euclid's
axioms" and in the Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes tried to establish
political theory on principles established with the same kind of
geometrical certainty.
49
However, restitution and retribution became increasingly discrete con-
cepts, which were rarely intermingled by this point; retribution often ex-
ceeded civil restitution, and by imposing additional concerns such as deter-
rence, criminal punishment sought to protect society. 50 While Utilitarians
Dominican Province, trans., Benzinger Bros. 1918) [hereinafter 2 SUMMA THEOLOGICA] ("On
the contrary, Restitution belongs to justice, because it re-establishes equality.").
48. Henry F. Fradella, Mixed Signals and Muddied Waters: Making Sense of the Propor-
tionality Principle and the Eighth Amendment, 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 498, 502 (2006).
49. Mark C. Modak-Truran, Beyond Theocracy and Secularism (Part i): Toward a New
Paradigm for Law and Religion, 27 Miss. C. L. REV. 159, 174-75 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
50. Albin Eser, The Nature and Rationale of Punishment, 28 CARDozO L. REV. 2427,
2430, 2433-34 (2007).
[Vol. 35
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such as Jeremy Bentham argued against the distinction, Lord Mansfield con-
tended "that there is no distinction better known, than the [difference] be-
tween" criminal and civil redress. 51 The focus shifted away from remedies
like restitution, and torture, humiliation, and death, became common forms
of punishment within the penal system, particularly in early America.
52
Incarceration was becoming increasingly popular as well, and reformer
John Howard, wrote chilling details about the horrors he encountered during
his 1777 tours of various British prisons. 53 America responded by moving
towards the development of solitary cells for serious offenders, and larger
cells for other inmates to avoid overcrowding conditions.54 John Augustus,
in the mid-19th century, promoted rehabilitation rather than jail, and was
able to convince a number of courts to release first-time offenders capable of
being reformed, into his custody to be supervised. 55 Probation as a criminal
sentence was the product of a movement in America to find alternatives to
incarceration for those who were confined.56 Though arguably, the new
placement of emphasis on the offender shifted the focus away from the vic-
tim.,,
51. Alan T. Harland, Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime: Assessing the Role of
the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REV. 52 (1982).
52. Joshua Logan Pennel, Comment, The End of Indeterminate Sentencing in New York:
The Death and Rebirth of Rehabilitation, 58 BuFF. L. REV. 507, 511 -12 (2010).
New York, during the colonial period, had more than 200 crimes which could result in the
death penalty. Long-term incarceration was rare. 'County jails were reserved primarily for
pretrial detainees and debtors.' Harsh penalties that consisted of public shaming or death were
'intended to frighten, and thereby deter, the would-be offender from committing a crime.
Id.
53. Hadar Aviram, Defining the Problem, 7 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 161, 161
(2010).
54. Will Tress, Unintended Collateral Consequences: Defining Felony in the Early
American Republic, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 461, 469 (2009).
55. Major Tyesha E. Lowery, One "Get Out of Jail Free" Card: Should Probation Be
an Authorized Courts-Martial Punishment?, 198 MIL. L. REV. 165, 169-70 (2008).
Augustus' probationers performed remarkably well and seemingly reformed their lives. Even
then, Augustus frustrated law enforcement officials 'who wanted the offenders punished, not
helped.' Nevertheless, it was difficult to argue with his success and his ideas spread. 'In 1878,
Massachusetts was the first state to adopt a formal probation law for juveniles.' By 1910,
twenty-one states had probation statutes ....
Id.
56. Kellie Brady, Some People Just Shouldn't Have Kids!: Probation Conditions Limit-
ing the Fundamental Right to Procreate and How Texas Courts Should Handle the Issue, 16
TEx. WESLEYAN L. REV. 225, 227 (2010).
57. Kelly, supra note 47, at 686. "'History suggests that growing interest in the reforma-
tion of the criminal is matched by decreasing care for the victim."' Id. (quoting STEPHEN
SCHAFER, COMPENSATION AND RESTITUTION TO VICTIMS OF CRIME 12 (2d ed. 1970)).
2011]
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The notions of probation and rehabilitation became popular and spread
across the states.5 s In the late 1800's, many federal courts were resorting to
the use of a suspended entry of sentence, which led to a legal issue that
would be decided after the turn of the century.59 Congress had attempted to
pass a probation statute in 1916, but met great difficulties:
Establishing probation as a sentencing option in the federal courts
did not happen quickly or easily. Opinion on the wisdom of doing
so was sharply divided. Some federal judges were for probation,
seeing it as an alternative to the sometimes harsh penalties they
were compelled to impose. Other federal judges were against pro-
bation, finding it too lenient. Congress could not reach agreement
on a national plan. The first bills for a federal probation law had
been introduced in Congress in 1909. But it was not until 1925-
and after more than [thirty] bills had been introduced-that one
such bill became law.
60
In 1916, in the decision of Ex Parte United States,61 the Supreme Court
of the United States, in addressing a writ of mandamus brought by both the
U.S. Attorney General and the U.S. Solicitor General, held that a district
court judge named John M. Killits was without power to suspend a sentence
indefinitely. 62 This ruling became more commonly known as the "Killits
decision" and became the impetus for the enactment of the Federal Probation
Act of 1925 (FPA),63 which allowed the courts to suspend the imposition of a
sentence and place an offender on probation. 64 District courts were now free
to place offenders on probation up to an amount of time not to exceed five
years "upon such terms and conditions as they... deem[ed] best" when the
58. See Beginnings of Probation and Pretrial Services, U.S. COURTS,
http:lhost4.uscourts.gov/fedproblhistorylbeginnings.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
59. Id. ("Increasingly, however, the U.S. Department of Justice disapproved of the use of
the suspended sentence, believing that it infringed upon executive pardoning power and there-
fore was unconstitutional.").
60. Id.
61. 242 U.S. 27 (1916).
62. Id. at 51-52 (1916), superseded by statute, Federal Probation Act of 1925, ch. 521 §
1,, 43 Stat. 1259 (codified as amended at 18 USC § 3651) (repealed 1987), as stated in Af-
fronti v. U.S., 350 U.S. 79 (1955) ("[Wle can see no reason for saying that we may now hold
that the right exists to continue a practice which is inconsistent with the Constitution, since its
exercise, in the very nature of things amounts to a refusal by the judicial power to perform a
duty resting upon it, and, as a consequence thereof, to an interference with both the legislative
and executive authority as fixed by the Constitution.").
63. Federal Probation Act of 1925, ch. 521, § I.
64. Id.
[Vol. 35
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court was satisfied that "the ends of justice and the best interests of the pub-
lic, as well as the defendant," would be served thereby.65
The discretionary power of this new law also "permitted federal courts
to issue restitution orders as a condition of probation." 66 To be sure though,
there was no specific mention of restitution or reparation on the statute books
of most laws of many states or in the federal code, even going into the late
1930s. Nonetheless, the power to grant restitution had been implicitly read
into the statutory provisions permitting suspended sentence and probation
conditions, notwithstanding silence on the issue.67 Subsequent amendments
to section 3651 would change this condition from an implied one to an ex-
pressed one, as it provided that a probationer "[m]ay be required to make
restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss
caused by the offense for which conviction was had. 68 Also, by implication,
a district court was not authorized to order restitution while a defendant was
incarcerated since "the FPA authorizes a district court to impose restitution
only as a condition of [a] defendant's probation. 69
However, the judicial determination of the offender's ability to pay
compensation was a requirement of any imposition of restitution.70 Also it
was impermissible to order compensation in excess of the actual loss. 7 1 The
Government could qualify as a victim where the offense involved defrauding
the Internal Revenue Service, but the restitution still had to be limited to only
that which stemmed from the offenses for which the defendant was actually
convicted.72 If a district court ordered restitution for amounts which were not
determined to be due and owing, that order would not only be premature, but
in excess of the statutory authority.73 The ability to impose restitution also
65. Id.
66. Kelly, supra note 47, at 691.
67. Id.; see also Federal Probation Act of 1925, § I.
68. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1948), repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984).
69. United States v. Angelica, 859 F.2d 1390, 1392 (9th Cir. 1988).
70. United States v. Boswell, 605 F.2d 171, 175 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Wilson,
469 F.2d 368, 370 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Taylor, 321 F.2d 339, 341 (4th Cir. 1963).
71. See Karrell v. United States, 181 F.2d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 1950).
72. United States v. Taylor, 305 F.2d 183, 187 (4th Cir. 1962).
The judge could, however, properly require, as a condition of probation, payment of those tax-
es reported by the defendant as due for 1958, 1959 and 1960 since such liability is admitted
and no question of restitution of fraudulently evaded taxes would be involved. Amounts in
excess of defendant's admitted tax liability may not, as a condition of probation, be directed to
be paid during the probationary period prior to the time such amounts are finally and legally
determined, and then only if collection is not barred by a statute of limitation.
Id.
73. United States v. Stoehr, 196 F.2d 276, 284 (3d Cir. 1952).
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extended to probation sentences under the Federal Youth Corrections Act.74
The district courts had the discretion to impose restitution in combination
with probation as a sentencing alternative to juveniles.7 5 Probation with res-
titution was even extended in a case involving criminal liability of a corpora-
tion.76
However, as to most, it was infrequently used as a tool between 1925
and 1982, and a clarion call for change would revolutionize this cumbersome
approach that dominated the early to mid-twentieth century.77 Margery Fry,
a criminal justice reformer and one of the first women in Britain to become a
magistrate, championed the cause of restitution and brought it to the fore-
front of both English and American thinking.78
III. THE CHANGING NEEDS OF AMERICAN SOCIETY AND RESTITUTION IN
FEDERAL SENTENCING
Centuries before the dialogue on restitution came to penal law in Amer-
ica, Bentham, in his work, Theory of Legislation, laid the groundwork for
restitution within the criminal justice system.79 It, therefore, is ironic that he
is cited as having laid the foundations for the shift towards a greater retribu-
tive model and that Fry had to re-raise the dialogue about victim compensa-
tion.80 Fry was aided by two other proponents, Stephen Schafer and Albert
Eglash, who also suggested newer paradigms for a model of criminal jus-
74. United States v. Hix, 545 F.2d 1247, 1247 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) ("Although a
fine is inherently punitive, restitution is not. So long as repayment is made to the victim and
does not exceed the damage caused by the offense, restitution is essentially rehabilitative, and
hence consistent with the purpose of the Youth Corrections Act.").
75. United States v. Buechler, 557 F.2d 1002, 1007 (3d Cir. 1977).
In any event, the youth will have learned the first lesson that society-in its effort to rehabili-
tate all offenders-tries to teach: society, whenever it can help it, will not allow crime to pay.
In view of substantial scholarly support for the proposition that restitution may be rehabilita-
tive in certain cases, we decline the invitation to read the Federal Youth Corrections Act as
proscribing it.
Id. (footnote omitted).
76. United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58, 61 (7th Cir. 1972) ("If suspen-
sion of the imposition of a fine to enable an individual to make restitution is appropriate in
certain cases, a similar suspension may well be suitable for corporate defendants in appropri-
ate cases as well.").
77. See S. REP. No. 97-532, at 30 (1982) ("As simple as the principle of restitution is, it
lost its priority status in the sentencing procedures of our federal courts long ago.").
78. See THE VICTIM IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 12 (Hans Joachim Schneider ed.,
1982).
79. JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 288 (R. Hildreth trans., Trubner & Co.
2d ed. 1864).
80. See Thad H. Westbrook, Note, At Least Treat Us Like Criminals!: South Carolina
Responds to Victims' Pleas for Equal Rights, 49 S.C. L. REv. 575, 578 n.23 (1998).
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tice.8 1 The ensuing victims' rights movement began to alter the role of the
victim, as follows:
The goal of the movement was to force the justice system to rea-
lign itself to better represent the interests of victims. As part of
that overall goal, the movement urged several substantive changes,
including that offenders be required to make full monetary restitu-
tion to the victims of their criminal acts. The movement's success
and influence was evidenced by the formation of a task force on
crime authorized by President Reagan, which, in its final report in
1982, echoed the desires of most victims: increased significance
of victims' rights in the administration of criminal justice. 82
Thus, in the decade prior to the Reagan task force on crime, the move-
ment reflected public sentiment that the criminal justice system had become
overly focused on the offender and not focused enough on the victim.83 With
the Supreme Court handing down decisions in Mapp v. Ohio,84 Gideon v.
Wainwright,s5 and Miranda v. Arizona,s6 the public feared for its protection
because it perceived that the law had made it easier for criminals to escape
on legal technicalities. 87  As a response, the President's Task Force con-
ducted a national study of the plight of crime victims and proposed recom-
mendations in the improvement of compensation to ameliorate their condi-
tion.88  Taking this advice, Congress passed legislation-which had been
sorely needed-granting direct authority to federal courts to order restitution
81. See generally Stephen Schafer, Compensation of Victims of Criminal Offenses, 10
CRIM. L. BULL. 605 (1974); Albert Eglash, Creative Restitution: Some Suggestions for Prison
Rehabilitation Programs, 28 AM. J. CORRECTION 20 (1958).
82. Brian Kleinhaus, Note, Serving Two Masters: Evaluating the Criminal or Civil Na-
ture of the VWPA and MVRA Through the Lens of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Abatement
Doctrine, and the Sixth Amendment, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2711, 2720 (2005) (footnotes omit-
ted).
83. Id. at 2719-20 ("The victims' rights movement arose as a response to a societal fear
of crime in America.").
84. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (establishing the exclusionary rule suppressing the eviden-
tiary fruits of unlawful police action, which violated the Fourth Amendment).
85. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (mandating that the indigent criminally accused who faces
the risk of incarceration is entitled to the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment).
86. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that under the Fifth Amendment, the exclusionary
rule applies to confessions extracted when law enforcement has not first advised persons
under arrest of their rights).
87. See David G. Barnum, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial Decision
Making in the Post-New Deal Period, 47 J. POL. 652, 660 (1985).
88. See Final Report of the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, OFFICE FOR
VICTIMS OF CRIME, http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlovc/publications/presidentstskforcrprt/
welcome.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
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to victims of crime in the Victim and Witness Protection Act.89 Congress
intended with the Act to make restitution an integral part of the federal sen-
tencing process.90
By both authorizing courts to impose restitution independent of proba-
tion, the VWPA was a groundbreaking alteration of the federal restitution
framework. However, there were many opposed to it that challenged its con-
stitutionality because of the lack of a provision providing for a jury trial
complying with the Seventh Amendment. 9 As one commentator opined:
The restitution provisions of the Victim and Witness Protec-
tion Act will in some cases violate the seventh amendment right of
the offender to a civil jury trial. Where the restitution amounts to
first category relief under the VWPA, it may constitutionally be
ordered without a jury trial. Courts ordered this type of relief
without a separate civil action in England in 1791 and the seventh
amendment, being historically grounded, permits actions to be
tried without a jury when they were so tried at the time of the
amendment's ratification. Where, however, the restitution amounts
to compensatory damages, awarding it without a jury trial violates
the seventh amendment. The structure of the VWPA and its legis-
lative history reflect that the restitutionary remedy was intended to
replace the civil remedy; given this, the protections attached to that
civil remedy must attach to any replacement of it. Moreover, resti-
tution awards under the VWPA cannot be viewed as the adjudica-
tion of a public right, which would render the seventh amendment
inapplicable.
92
The circuit courts rejected Seventh Amendment challenges.93  The
VWPA was also attacked on Fifth Amendment grounds94 that it did not pro-
89. See Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 5, 96 Stat. 1248, 1253 (1982) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 3663 (2006)).
90. See S. REP. No. 97-532, at 30 (1982) ("The principle of restitution is an integral part
of virtually every formal system of criminal justice, of every culture and every time. It holds
that, whatever else the sanctioning power of society does to punish its wrongdoers, it should
also insure [sic] that the wrongdoer is required to the degree possible to restore the victim to
his or her prior state of well-being.").
91. The Seventh Amendment states that "[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." U.S.
CONST. amend. VII.
92. Margaret Raymond, Note, The Unconstitutionality of the Victim and Witness Protec-
tion Act Under the Seventh Amendment, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1590, 1615 (1984).
93. See United States v. Keith, 754 F.2d 1388, 1391-92 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Watchman, 749 F.2d 616, 617 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905, 908
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vide adequate due process.95 Such due process challenges have also been
disallowed.96 The VWPA was also attacked under Fourteenth Amendment
grounds that it did not provide equal protection under the law.97 This ground
was rejected because it is necessarily the case that individualized circums-
tances pertaining to victims and defendants will result in different treatment,
and mere disparity alone is insufficient to violate equal protection.98 Like-
wise, Sixth Amendment criminal jury trial and Eighth Amendment cruel and
unusual punishment challenges were also largely unsuccessful. 99
Though the VWPA greatly enhanced federal courts' discretionary pow-
er to order restitution, there were drawbacks. Under section 3664(a), when
deciding whether to impose restitution and the amount of restitution, courts
were required to consider the amount of the loss sustained by any victim as a
result of the offense, as well as "the financial resources of the defendant....
financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's de-
pendents, and such other ... factors as the court deems appropriate."'' t  As
the court in United States v. Copple'0 ' observed, this provision had the prac-
tical effect of ensuring that restitution judgments did not exceed offenders'
ability to pay.102 Defendants could not be set up to fail, so to speak. 0 3 The
(2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 836-37 (1 1th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Florence, 741 F.2d 1066, 1067-68 (8th Cir. 1984).
94. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
95. Under the Fifth Amendment, "A criminal defendant must be afforded.., due process
at a sentencing proceeding." United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 477 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948)).
96. Id.
97. See United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 841 (11 th Cir. 1984). It is not consti-
tutionally impermissible to treat similarly situated defendants differently. Id.
98. Palma, 760 F.2d at 478-79.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Keith, 754 F.2d 1388, 1390-92 (9th Cir. 1985).
100. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(3) (2006).
101. 74 F.3d 479 (3d Cir. 1996).
102. Id. at 485.
Even if the government is correct that Copple has retained $623,334 in assets, under the court's
order Copple must come up with over $3.6 million in five years to satisfy the restitution order,
plus an additional $665,859 to pay off back taxes. Copple is currently incarcerated, has a wife
and two children to support after he completes his term, and faces his employment prospects
with fraud and tax evasion convictions in tow. The value of a college degree notwithstanding,
we cannot say-in the absence of the factual findings discussed-that on substantive review
we could conclude the court's order to be factually supportable.
Id.
103. See id.
The relevant determination in favor of an order of restitution, therefore, is not a court's vague
appreciation of a defendant's "potential to succeed" financially at some point in the undefined
future, but, rather, its finding by a preponderance of the evidence that there exists a realistic
prospect that defendant will be able to pay the required amount within five years.
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Copple court understood that crafty offenders might well be very good at
hiding the ill-gotten proceeds:
We do not suggest that a defendant who has become expert at
secreting the proceeds of the crime can avoid the obligation to dis-
gorge them. The proceeds from a defendant's illegal conduct that
the defendant still retains or can recoup are certainly encompassed
within the "financial resources of the defendant," 18 U.S.C. §
3664(a), that the district court should consider in fashioning a res-
titution order. Of course, the continued existence of such proceeds
is a factual issue that should be accompanied by "specific find-
ings."
Although we have not seen it applied elsewhere, we believe
there is a method by which the court can fashion a restitution order
that accounts for the court's reasonable belief that there are se-
creted assets and that satisfies the court's obligation to make the
necessary supporting findings. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d), the
sentencing court has broad discretion to assign to either party
"[t]he burden of demonstrating such other matters as the court
deems appropriate" in the course of its fact-finding. It would be
sufficient for a district court that believes, based on the record, that
such proceeds are still available to determine the amount properly
attributable to the defendant with reasonable precision.' 04
Therefore, the court of appeal believed that the district court could not
skirt its burden to specifically demonstrate how it believed the defendant
could pay, notwithstanding the defendant's resourcefulness at concealing his
assets. 10 5 Still, in some cases, this could pose some difficulty in doing.
10 6
Id.
104. Copple, 74 F.3d at 484.
105. Id. Judge (now Justice) Alito's concurrence is of great interest, in that, while he
concurred with the majority, he suggested that the burden of proof be on the defendant, and
not the Government. See id. at 485-86 (Alito, J., concurring). He wrote:
Defendants convicted of fraud offenses are sometimes masters at hiding assets. There-
fore, if the government bore the burden of proving that such defendants still possess illegally
obtained assets, the government would be unable to locate hidden assets, those assets would
not be taken into account in framing the restitution orders, and the defendants would continue
to profit at the expense of the innocent victims. This would be unconscionable.
Id. at 486. The solution is to place the burden of proof on the defendant to show what has
happened to all of the illegally obtained assets. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(3) (2006). All the
assets for which the defendant cannot account may be included in the amount of restitution
ordered. See id. To the extent that records are unavailable, the risk of inaccuracy should be
borne by the defendant rather than the victims. See id. As the MVRA was enacted the same
year as the Copple decision, Congress saw fit to do that: The change placed the entirety of the
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Another further issue that also posed some difficulty with interpretation
of the VWPA was that "[t]he statutes did not further define what constituted
the financial resources of the defendant."'0 7 Additionally, most governmen-
tal agencies can qualify as victims under the VWPA to whom restitution
must be paid. °8 However, a governmental agency could not be a victim un-
der the VWPA when it actively created the conditions leading to the loss,
due to a law enforcement sting operation. 109
With the exception of several minor amendments, the federal restitution
structure remained relatively intact until Congress passed the Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) in 1996.'10 The MVRA made restitution
mandatory in almost all cases where the victim suffered an identifiable mon-
etary loss from an enumerated crime."' The MVRA removed from the dis-
trict courts the ability to fashion restitution orders based on an offender's
ability to pay.1 2 The MVRA was and now remains "all about mandating
restitution" and removing the power to decide otherwise from a district
burden on ability to pay on offenders, by eliminating it as a consideration altogether from the
amount determination. Compare id. (placing the entirety of the burden on ability to pay on
offenders), with United States v. St. Gelais, 952 F.2d 90, 98 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding Defen-
dant fully responsible for entire amount of substantiated loss, where court attempted to ascer-
tain Defendant's ability to pay, but Defendant was uncooperative and not forthcoming).
106. 1 had the experience of prosecuting a defendant in a Florida state circuit court for
first-degree felony grand theft exceeding $100,000. While in the middle of a lengthy eviden-
tiary hearing to determine the amount of restitution and the repayment schedule, during cross-
examination, I posed a question to the defendant concerning the whereabouts of the proceeds
from her home. The home had been sold for more than $400,000. Florida law required that
the state establish the defendant's financial resources and ability to pay when ordering a sche-
dule of repayment. The defendant promptly and incredulously replied that she had squan-
dered the money, and was now living in poverty. She then gratuitously injected, "Being poor
isn't something people like you would ever understand." The court admonished the defen-
dant, directing her to better spend her time answering the questions, and to avoid answers
attacking the prosecutor. Suffice it to say, based on the many theft and fraud cases that I
previously prosecuted, I am quite aware of just how difficult many offenders can be, and the
lengths of evasiveness they will go to in avoiding revealing the extent of their financial affairs.
107. GOODWIN ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL RESTITUTION § 9:10 (2010 ed. 2010).
108. See § 3664(i); see also United States v. Lincoln, 277 F.3d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 2002)
(noting that the language of § 3664(i) refers to cases in which the government is a victim).
109. United States v. Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 35-36 (Ist Cir. 1994) (holding the VWPA
applies to passive victims, not active ones, and that the ambiguity had to be resolved in favor
of the offender under the rule of lenity).
110. See generally Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
204, 110 Stat. 1214, 1227-41.
111. See United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 201 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding that a restitu-
tion order in the amount of $938,965.59 was mandatory where defendant is convicted of a
Title 18 offense against property and the victim has suffered pecuniary loss).
112. United States v. Williams, 612 F.3d 500, 509 (6th Cir. 2010).
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court.' 13 "No longer is the decision whether to order restitution for certain
crimes left to the discretion of the district court."
' 14
A district court is now required to "order restitution to each victim in
the full amount of each victim's losses as determined by the court and with-
out consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant.""1,5 How-
ever, the MVRA does require judges to consider the defendant's financial
resources when putting together a schedule of repayment. 1 6 There had been
the belief that the prior VWPA had often times left victims with an incom-
plete recovery of their losses."' 7 By removing judicial discretion and man-
dating that judges order restitution in the full amount of victims' losses,
Congress attempted to ensure adequate compensation."' While it might be
argued that restitution served other purposes, such as rehabilitation of the
offender," 9 this was not the primary purpose of the MVRA. The MVRA
reflected a shift towards a more victim-centric system of justice, one that was
well received by the public, and which remains to this day the law of restitu-
tion in federal sentencing. 20 However, the drawback with the wording of the
statute is that it has been difficult to determine whether the MVRA is a crim-
113. United States v. Dolan, 571 F.3d 1022, 1026 (10th Cir. 2009), aff'd by 130 S. Ct.
2533 (2010).
114. Id.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A) (2006); United States v. Taylor, 41 F. App'x. 380, 383
(10th Cir. 2002).
116. § 3664(f)(2)(A).
117. H.R. REP. No. 104-116, at 4 (1995) (stating that the new statute needed "to ensure
that criminals pay full restitution to their victims for all damages caused as a result of the
crime").
118. Heidi Grogan, Comment, Characterizing Criminal Restitution Pursuant to the Man-
datory Victims Restitution Act: Focus on the Third Circuit, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1079, 1101
(2005).
Most illuminating are the opening remarks by one of the co-sponsors of the Senate bill, Sena-
tor Orrin G. Hatch, at the initial Senate Hearing on mandatory victim restitution:
"[R]ecompense for loss is unrelated to a judge's discretion to fashion a sentence. Restitution is
not an alternative to punishment, nor is it even part of the sentence imposed. Rather, it is what
the victim is due irrespective of any other punishment." Senator Hatch's use of the word "oth-
er" is similar to the language of the MVRA. It is unfortunate that this careless choice of words
("any other punishment") is reflected in the MVRA's statutory language, because it is clear
that Senator Hatch did not wish to make restitution an addition to a defendant's criminal pu-
nishment. Rather, by giving a victim "what he is due," Senator Hatch intended restitution to
restore a victim to his pre-crime state.
Id. at 1102 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
119. S. REP. No. 104-179, at 12 (1995) (pointing out that the MVRA "ensure[s] that the
offender realizes the damage caused by the offense and pays the debt owed to the victim as
well as to society").
120. See, e.g., United States v. Grimes, 173 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[Ihe intended
beneficiaries are the victims, not the victimizers.").
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inal punishment or civil compensation for purposes of many of the chal-
lenges that were mounted against it.
121
Nonetheless, aside from the previously mentioned attacks on the consti-
tutionality of the MVRA, a new issue would unfold: the statute's proscrip-
tion that restitution should be imposed at the time of sentence, or no later
than 90 days thereafter. 22 Even where additional losses become ascertaina-
ble at a later date, section 3664(d)(5) provides for an amended order of resti-
tution within 60 days after discovery of the losses.1 23 What would happen in
those restitution cases, where adhering to this time deadline would not be
possible?
IV. DOLAN V. UNITED STATES
In September of 2006, Brian Russell Dolan, a member of the Mescalero
Apache Indian Tribe, while intoxicated, severely injured a fellow tribe mem-
ber, Evan Ray Tissnolthtos, in a fight which took place on tribal reservation
grounds. 24 When Dolan' s sister learned of the fight, she contacted the local
police who discovered Tissnolthos bleeding on the side of the road. 125 Tiss-
nolthos was transported by helicopter to a hospital and treated for his inju-
ries. 126 His medical bills were paid by the Indian Health Service medical
program, a governmental agency. 127  Dolan was charged federally1 28 with
121. Matthew Spohn, Note, A Statutory Chameleon: The Mandatory Victim Restitution
Act's Challenge to the Civil/Criminal Divide, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1013, 1041 (2001).
Finally, the resolution of this debate brings into focus the challenge of determining whether
statutes are criminal or civil. In this endeavor, courts should not forget the purposes behind the
Supreme Court's civil/criminal test. This test is needed only because Congress has sometimes
sought to evade the procedural protections defendants receive in criminal proceedings by giv-
ing criminal sanctions civil labels.
Id.
122. See United States v. Stevens, 211 F.3d 1, 4-5 (2d Cir. 2000) (addressing whether a
restitution order issued 117 days after sentencing was invalid).
123. 18 U.S.C.§ 3664(d)(5) (2006); see also United States v. Minneman, 143 F.3d 274,
284 (7th Cir. 1998).
124. United States v. Dolan, 571 F.3d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir. 2009) aff'd by 130 S. Ct. 2533
(2010); Brief for Petitioner at 5, Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533 (2010) (No. 09-367).
125. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 125, at 5.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2006).
Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other person any
of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under
chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon,
assault resulting in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), an assault
against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, felony child abuse or neglect,
arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian country,
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assault resulting in serious bodily injury, and was prosecuted in the United
States District Court of New Mexico.129 Dolan pled guilty on February 8,
2007.130 In May of 2007, the Office of Probation filed its Presentence Inves-
tigation Report (PSR), but was unable to provide any amounts for restitution
pertaining to the victim's medical bills, because the Indian Health Service
failed to respond timely to their requests for documentation.
1 31
The district court attempted to set the matter for sentencing on June 28,
2007, but on June 27, 2007, the Government requested a continuance of the
sentencing.1 32 The sentencing was reset and eventually took place on July
30, 2007.13 3 The district court sentenced Dolan to twenty-one months in
prison followed by three years supervised release, but was unable to deter-
mine the amount of restitution134 because the Government was still unable to
provide documentation of victim restitution. 135
The district court first gave the impression that it wanted to reset the
matter for another 90-days, but then proceeded to verbally order restitution
on the date of sentencing, but left the matter open due to insufficient infor-
mation before it. 136 On August 8, 2007, the district court entered judgment,
using the standard Administrative Office form but left the restitution amount
blank and indicated the following in the section regarding payment schedule:
"'Pursuant to the Mandatory Restitution Act, restitution is applicable; how-
ever, no information has been received regarding possible restitution pay-
ments that may be owed. Therefore, the Court will not order restitution at
this time. ' ' 137
On October 5, 2007, the probation office created an addendum to the
PSR indicating that the total of the victim's medical bills was $105,559.78.38
The 90-day deadline from the sentencing hearing date expired on October
28, 2007.139 The district court did not hold a hearing to determine restitution
shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above
offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
Id.
129. Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2537 (2010).
130. Id.
131. Id.; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 125, at 6.
132. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 125, at 6.
133. Dolan, 130 S. Ct. at 2537.
134. Id. The Government's victim advocate indicated the victim allegedly had an out-
standing bill of $80,000, but was unable to obtain confirmation or reach the victim. Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 125, at 6.
135. Dolan, 130 S. Ct. at 2537.
136. Id.; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 125, at 7.
137. Dolan, 130 S. Ct. at 2537.
138. Dolan, 571 F.3d at 1024.
139. Id. at 1025.
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until February 4, 2008.'" At the time, Dolan objected on grounds of juris-
diction, as more than six months had elapsed since sentencing. 41 The court
requested the parties submit briefs on the 90-day limitation provision, and
later held oral argument on the jurisdiction issue. 142
The district court determined that it retained jurisdiction and entered an
opinion and restitution order requiring Dolan to pay the Indian Health Ser-
vice $104,649.78, with scheduled payments of $250 per month. 143  Dolan
timely appealed the restitution order to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
arguing inter alia, that the district court erred in imposing a void order.'
4
"
The court of appeals affirmed on the grounds that the congressional intent of
section 3664 would be frustrated if jurisdiction could be lost due to timing. 45
Thus, it held that because section 3664 is in the nature of a claims processing
rule, it was never intended that somehow an offender's due process rights
and need for sentencing finality could outweigh the victim's right to restitu-
tion. 146  Dolan filed a writ for petition of certiorari; the Supreme Court
granted the petition. 14
7
The Tenth Circuit was not alone in its line of thinking at the time. The
Sixth Circuit held that the 90-day provision is not a jurisdictional limitation,
because this would be inconsistent with the 60-day provision for an amended
order at a later date. 48 The Second and Third Circuits permitted tolling of
the 90-day provision, where the reason for delay is occasioned by the offend-
er.149 The First and Fourth Circuits also held the passing of the 90-day dead-
line did not divest the district court of further subject matter jurisdiction. 5 1
The Ninth Circuit further held that violation of the timing requirements of
section 3664 did not result in a loss of jurisdiction to order restitution. 15
140. Id.
141. Id.; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 125, at 8.
142. Dolan, 571 F.3d at 1025.
143. Id.; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 125, at 8-9.
144. Dolan, 571 F.3d at 1025.
145. Id. at 1029-30.
146. Id. at 1031.
147. See Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2537 (2010).
148. United States v. Vandeberg, 201 F.3d 805, 814 (6th Cir. 2000).
149. United States v. Terlingo, 327 F.3d 216, 222-23 (3d Cir. 2003) (allowing for time
greater than the 90-day time period, where the defendant's actions are cause for the delay);
United States v. Stevens, 211 F.3d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 2000) (also tolling 90-day deadline for defen-
dant's delay); see also United States v. Douglas, 525 F.3d 225, 252-53 (2d Cir. 2008).
150. See United States v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 187, 199 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Cheal, 389 F.3d 35, 48-49 (1st Cir. 2004).
151. United States v. Cienfuegos, 462 F.3d 1160, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2006).
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However, the Sixth Circuit decided the matter differently in another
opinion.'52 The Seventh Circuit also held that a late entered restitution order
was void for failing to observe the 90-day requirement. 153 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit likewise found that a restitution order violating the deadline was without
jurisdiction.' 54 There was a true split within the circuits.
On review, Justice Breyer delivered the majority opinion, holding that
even when a sentencing court misses MyRA's 90-day deadline to make final
determination of victim's losses and impose restitution, it retains jurisdiction
over restitution, where that court made clear prior to the deadline's expira-
tion that it would order restitution. 5 5 The Court seeks to strike a balance, but
admits that the victim's right to mandatory restitution outweighs the offend-
er's need for finality. 156 The Court advises that an offender can use manda-
mus as a remedy for any transgressions by the district court, where the sen-
tencing court has truly failed to observe the requirements of section 3664.57
Finally, the Court dismisses the "rule of lenity" argument, finding that there
is no ambiguity within the MVRA in need of resolution.158
Chief Justice Roberts delivered a powerful dissent. 59 He cautioned that
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not permit the indefi-
nite extension of time to comply with ordering restitution under the MVRA,
which the majority ignores. 16° He reminded the majority, that all sentencing
must be completed on the date of sentencing; any extension of time beyond
that must be specifically provided for by rule. 16 1 He scathingly summarized
152. United States v. Jolivette, 257 F.3d 581, 584 (6th Cir. 2001).
Accordingly, we hold that when the 90-day clock runs out, the judgment of conviction and
sentence, including the restitution provision, becomes final by operation of the statute. We
therefore have jurisdiction to review the judgment of conviction and sentence. It follows that
because there was no timely judicial determination of the restitution amount, the judgment
contains no enforceable restitution provision.
Id. at 584-85.
153. United States v. Farr, 419 F.3d 621, 625-26 (7th Cir. 2005) (invalidating restitution
order for lack of jurisdiction. However, the court noted that had the government proposed
theories for the delay, the result may have been different).
154. United States v. Maung, 267 F.3d 1113, 1122 (1 lth Cir. 2001) (finding no authority
to enter a restitution order beyond the ninety days).
155. Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2542 (2010).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 2544.
159. Id. "[T]wo wrongs do not make a right, and that mistake gave the court no authority
to amend Dolan's sentence later, beyond the 90 days allowed to add a sentencing term requir-
ing restitution." Dolan, 130 S. Ct. at 2549 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 2545 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 2546 ("Section 3664(d)(5) is self-executing: It grants authority subject to a
deadline, and if the deadline is not met, the authority is no longer available.").
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the rule announced by the majority: "[O]nce the camel's nose of some per-
mitted delay sneaks under the tent, any further delay is permissible."'162 He
cautioned that the majority does not seem "to need [section] 3664(d)(5) at
all.' ' 163 He concluded, if there is any balancing to be done, the job belongs to
Congress, not to the Court.' 64 Although he never referenced the term, it is
clear that Chief Justice Roberts' impression of the majority decision is that it
is a dangerous move of judicial activism.
V. WHO SAID THERE WAS NO SUCH THING AS "DEBTOR'S PRISON"?
The obvious effect of the Dolan decision is that less offenders will be
able to escape the imposition of restitution based on legal technicality. Con-
sidering the Congressional intent behind the MVRA, this serves its purpose
because the MVRA was a reactionary measure to the public backlash against
those Supreme Court decisions that afforded greater protections to the cimi-
nal accused in America. However, one has to question the wisdom of a rule,
which allows a district court to suggest that it is thinking about ordering res-
titution, to sufficiently serve to toll the 90-day deadline. The offender has
little expectation of finality.
The decision seemed more of a Solomonic compromise, rather than a
true reading of the statute in question. If the government were right, then it
should not matter whether the district court announces on the record, to alert
an offender that it wants to impose restitution in the future. The deadline
should not apply at all. Restitution should be ordered, when the Government
has sufficient information to bring the matter before the court. However, it is
said that the 90-day suggestive deadline is for the benefit of the victim, in
that it encourages the courts to address these matters sooner than later.
If the defendant were right, then the 90-day deadline should be strictly
adhered to, as restitution is purely a creature of statute. Failure to observe
the statute should result in the court lacking jurisdiction over the defendant
because the court's authority cannot exceed what is provided for in the sta-
tute.
The Supreme Court, in supplanting its own directive, appears to be le-
gislating what Congress did not provide for.165 If Congress wanted to devise
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2548.
164. Dolan, 130 S. Ct. at 2549.
165. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 487-88 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting). The dissent stated:
Indeed, there is reason to believe that some legislative bodies have welcomed judicial activism
with respect to a subject so inherently difficult and so politically sensitive that the prospect of
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such a convoluted rule, it would have provided for it directly in the MVRA.
The Dolan decision, read in the negative, stands for the proposition that the
district court loses jurisdiction if it fails to announce at any time during sen-
tencing, or the 90 days thereafter, that it intends to impose restitution.
66
Therefore, offenders have some right to insist upon escaping restitution if the
district court fails to make at least some type of signal of how it intends to
proceed prior to the deadline expiration. 67 Two cases that were decided after
Dolan have tried to clarify what is sufficient enough to constitute that signal.
In Fu Sheng Kuo v. United States,168 the Supreme Court reviewed on pe-
tition for writ of certiorari the court of appeals' affirming decision of the
timing of a district court's restitution order exceeding the 90-day deadline. 69
The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for consideration in
light of its prior decision in Dolan.7 ° On remand, the Ninth Circuit in Unit-
ed States v. Fu Sheng Kuo, 17 1 held that even where the written order did not
reflect that the district court ordered restitution, the transcript reflected that
the district court orally pronounced this and that the oral pronouncement
controlled. 17
2
Shortly prior to the Fu Sheng Kuo decision, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed a district court's imposition of a restitution amount eight
days after the expiration of the 90-day deadline in United States v. Pickett.1
7
'
Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Dolan, the court of appeals
affirmed, pointing to the record which reflected that the district court in-
tended to order restitution, but delayed only as to the determination of the
amount. 74 "Those statements, each of which was made before the expiration
of the ninety-day period, left no doubt that restitution would be imposed."'75
More likely than not though, absent total misstep and silence, it does not
others confronting it seems inviting. Federal courts no longer should encourage this deference
by the appropriate authorities-no matter how willing they may be to defer.
Id.; see also Keenan D. Kmiec, Comment, The Origin and Current Meanings of "Judi-
cial Activism", 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1441, 1472 (2004) ("In short, courts are less competent
policy-making bodies than the legislature.").
166. See Dolan, 130 S. Ct. at 2537.
167. Id. at 2541 ("Though a deliberate failure of the sentencing court to comply with the
statute seems improbable, should that occur, the defendant can also seek mandamus.").
168. 130 S. Ct. 3458 (2010).
169. Id. at 3458.
170. Id.
171. 620 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2010).
172. Id. at 1163.
173. 612 F.3d 147, 148 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
174. Id. at 149.
175. Id.
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seem likely that there will be an occasion where a district court will fail to be
deemed as ordering restitution.
Moving away from subsequent decisions, to more carefully explore the
implications of Dolan, one has to look towards failure: What happens when
the offender fails to pay restitution imposed? While there are a variety of
recourses, the most common and harsh sanction is to revoke probation and
sentence the offender to incarceration. The Supreme Court in Bearden v.
Georgia'76 outlined the test district courts are to follow in considering revo-
cation based on violation of repayment conditions of supervised release.'77
Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion of the Court.178 Reviewing
such cases under a due process "fundamental fairness" analysis under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 79 the Court held that "if the State determines a fine
or restitution to be the appropriate and adequate penalty for the crime, it may
not thereafter imprison a person solely because he [or she] lacked the re-
sources to pay it.' 180 However, should a district court find that the failure to
repay has been willful, then the court need not take into consideration wheth-
er the defendant lacks the resources or not.'"' Making it abundantly clear
that a defendant's poverty status in no way protects him or her from punish-
ment the Court concluded:
We hold, therefore, that in revocation proceedings for failure to
pay a fine or restitution, a sentencing court must inquire into the
reasons for the failure to pay. If the probationer willfully refused
176. 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
177. See id. at 666-67.
178. Id. at661.
179. The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of cit-
izens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
180. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 667-68.
181. Id. at668.
This distinction, based on the reasons for nonpayment, is of critical importance here. If the
probationer has willfully refused to pay the fine or restitution when he has the means to pay,
the State is perfectly justified in using imprisonment as a sanction to enforce collection. Simi-
larly, a probationer's failure to make sufficient bona fide efforts to seek employment or borrow
money in order to pay the fine or restitution may reflect an insufficient concern for paying the
debt he owes to society for his crime. In such a situation, the State is likewise justified in re-
voking probation and using imprisonment as an appropriate penalty for the offense. But if the
probationer has made all reasonable efforts to pay the fine or restitution, and yet cannot do so
through no fault of his own, it is fundamentally unfair to revoke probation automatically with-
out considering whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the defendant are available.
Id. at 668-69 (citation omitted).
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to pay or failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts legally to ac-
quire the resources to pay, the court may revoke probation and
sentence the defendant to imprisonment within the authorized
range of its sentencing authority. If the probationer could not pay
despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do
so, the court must consider alternative measures of punishment
other than imprisonment. Only if alternative measures are not
adequate to meet the State's interests in punishment and deterrence
may the court imprison a probationer who has made sufficient bo-
na fide efforts to pay. To do otherwise would deprive the proba-
tioner of his conditional freedom simply because, through no fault
of his own, he cannot pay the fine. Such a deprivation would be
contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 82
The Court reversed the revocation of probation, holding that the trial
court's finding that the defendant knew for a long time what he had to do,
and failed to do so, was insufficient to demonstrate how the defendant failed
to make bona fide efforts to repay.
183
Yet contrast the result in the Bearden decision with the outcome of the
offender in United States v. Montgomery.84 The defendant had pled to "four
counts of using the mails to defraud charitable organizations [that assisted]
victims of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks."' 85 After serving a 21-
month prison sentence, the defendant started her 3-year term of supervised
release, the conditions of which involved keeping a steady job and repay-
ment of $63,817.94 in restitution, at the rate of $300 a month. 86 After two
years, she had only paid $474.16, failed to keep a steady job, and told her
probation officer that she could not keep applying for a job because she was
seeking Social Security benefits.'
87
Montgomery introduced testimony that she had made repeated efforts to
keep steady employment, and a mental health counselor testified to the ex-
tent of her mental illnesses. 188 When the Government's vocational rehabilita-
tion counselor was asked about Montgomery's employability, he responded
he had "'some concerns.""' 189 The district court found, based on a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that Montgomery had engaged in a pattern of manipu-
182. Id. at 672-73.
183. Id. at 674.
184. 532 F.3d 811 (8th Cir. 2008).
185. Id. at812-13.
186. Id. at813.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Montgomery, 532 F.3d at 813.
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lation and did not find her efforts to be bona fide,"9 revoking supervised
release and sentencing her to an additional eleven months of incarceration. 9'
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the revocation, finding
the district court did not commit clear error. 92 The circuit court applied the
Bearden analysis but found that the district court had found Montgomery
willfully failed "'to acquire the resources to pay"' and, in light of such will-
fulness, did not need to consider fundamental fairness or "alternative meas-
ures of punishment," as argued by her counsel. 193 The question is, however:
Should someone suffering from mental illness be factually found to be will-
fully not attempting to make bona fide efforts?' 94 In a factual close call, the
circuit courts of appeal are in no position to disturb the rulings of a district
court judge based on a cold record.' 95
Are we moving in the right direction? "If poverty tends to criminalize
people, it is also true that criminalization inexorably impoverishes them."'' 96
Professors Baird and Jackson described the laws of early English history as
"'viciously punitive from the perspective of the debtor."" 97 History has not
been kind to deadbeats, as:
190. Id. at 814. Particularly of note to the district court was the fact that she had found
work at varying times, but then lost her jobs subsequently thereafter. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 815.
193. Montgomery, 532 F.3d at 814.
194. See Ellen Byers, Mentally Ill Criminal Offenders and the Strict Liability Effect: Is
There Hope for a Just Jurisprudence in an Era of Responsibility/Consequences Talk?, 57
ARK. L. REV. 447, 520 (2004).
Today's evidence reveals that the problem posed by mentally ill offenders goes beyond the
narrow question of how many raise the defense, successfully or not, in their court cases be-
cause this number remains very small. But millions of severely mentally ill persons are ware-
housed in the modem-day equivalent of the sanitariums of the 1930s and 1940s, dark "pest-
houses" where "patients" were held for custody, not cure. Despite congressional recognition
in the 1950s that such conditions were barbaric, today many sick individuals exist in an equally
repugnant environment, often locked away in solitary confinement where self-mutilation, sui-
cide attempts, and other desperate cries for help are answered with inhumane punitive meas-
ures justified under findings of "rule violations." Political reaction to unfounded fears wound
up creating a situation many times worse, and much more intractable, than that originally im-
agined.
Id. at 520-21 (footnotes omitted).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Morin, 889 F.2d 328, 331 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating decision
revoking probation "will not be reversed absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion").
196. Barbara Ehrenreich, Op-Ed., Is It Now a Crime to Be Poor?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
2009, at 9.
197. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 Am.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 7 n.12 (1995) (quoting DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON,
CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 27-28 (2d ed. 1990)).
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English law was not unique in its lack of solicitude for debtors.
History's annals are replete with tales of draconian treatment of
debtors. Punishments inflicted upon debtors included forfeiture of
all property, relinquishment of the consortium of a spouse, impri-
sonment, and death. In Rome, creditors were apparently autho-
rized to carve up the body of the debtor, although scholars debate
the extent to which the letter of that law was actually enforced.'98
History indicates that in the United States, imprisonment for debt was
abolished at the federal level in 1833.'99 However, the decisions of the Su-
preme Court in Tate, Williams, and Bearden suggest that it was not, where
the offender is morally culpable and where sentenced to probation or super-
vised release, willfully fails to satisfy repayment orders, as determined by the
district courts. 200 The decisions in Dolan, Fu Sheng Kuo, and Pickett suggest
that mandatory restitution means no less than mandatory restitution, regard-
less of due process concerns. 201 It would seem the direction we are moving
in is the direction of our past.
Incarceration, followed by supervised release, followed by incarceration
upon failure to pay, seems to be perpetuating a jailhouse cycle.20 2 Moreover,
the presumption that jailing a probationer for nonpayment of debt is the best
way to ensure repayment falls short when as Justice O'Connor suggests in
Bearden, that to avoid more prison, the probationer may well resort to crimi-
nal activity to repay his or her obligations.2 3 The "tough on crime" selling
point of the victims' rights movement and the statutes enacted in response,
198. Tabb, supra note 198, at 7. "Imprisonment for debt was the order of the day, from
the time of the Statute of Merchants in 1285, until Dickens' time in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury." Id.
199. Id. at 16.
200. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 670 (1983); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 400-
01 (1971); United States v. Williams, 128 F.3d 1239, 1241 (8th Cir. 1997).
201. See Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2539 (2010); United States v. Fu Sheng
Kuo, 620 F.3d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pickett, 612 F.3d 147, 149 (2d Cir.
2010).
202. See Wendy McElroy, The Return of Debtors' Prison?, FREEMAN Apr. 2008, at 30, 34.
Imprisonment... is an unnecessary and dangerous exception to the due process to which
every individual is entitled both by the Constitution and by natural right. It also involves a
confusing, inconstant maze of laws that collapse the traditional distinction between criminal
and civil courts. As Justice Black observed, "It would be no overstatement... to say that the
offense with the most ill-defined and elastic contours in our law is now punished by the har-
shest procedures known to that law."
Id.
203. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 670-71 (1983).
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are questionable at best.2°4 "The most salient points of this statement should
be underscored-America has increased its incarceration rate 500% in twen-
ty-five years, it has 5% of the world's population but 25% of its prisoners,
and it competes only with Russia for world leadership in putting people in
prisons and jails. °20 5 This may well cast a dystopian shadow on the efficacy
of the MVRA itself, despite the well wishes of the public.
VI. CONCLUSION
When the public considers the damage and harm caused by white collar
criminals such as Martin Frankel-looted more than $200 million from the
insurance industry, Kenneth Lay-participated in Enron's fraud of more than
$1 billion from its shareholders, Bernard Ebbers-complicit with
WorldCom's accounting practices, which resulted in the theft of $3.8 billion
from its shareholders, and Bernard Madoff-ordered to pay $170 million in
restitution of the $64.8 billion in investment fraud he orchestrated, then the
MVRA seems like a blessing and a godsend, and the decision of the Supreme
206Court in Dolan seems like a wise and proper outcome. However, few of-
fenders have a decent enough education to commit large-scale sophisticated
crimes dreamt up in the confines of remote ivory towers.
For the rest of society, consider that mandatory restitution has placed a
Herculean burden on many offenders, particularly the indigent ones. This
actually discourages offender rehabilitation, and the "corresponding econom-
ic hardship can directly and indirectly cause recidivism. 2 °7 A policy of ad-
mittedly acquiescing to a jailhouse cycle surely implicates whether our con-
stitution protections of fundamental fairness have been stripped to the bone.
Additionally, are we doing ourselves any favors when we turn prisons into
warehouses for the sick and indigent, at a heavy price, that we all bear?
Therefore, the outcome of Dolan is another victory for victims, but a
substantial loss for the rehabilitation movement once led by reformers like
Augustus. Augustus was careful to only choose those offenders he felt had a
chance to turn their lives around and make a difference. Augustus never
chose people that arguably would be set up for failure. If we intend to pur-
204. Matthew Dickman, Should Crime Pay?: A Critical Assessment of the Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 1689, 1704 n.] 19 (2009) (discussing
that Congress was made aware that recidivism would increase, but declined to address it).
205. Robert G. Lawson, Difficult Times in Kentucky Corrections-Aftershocks of a
"Tough on Crime" Philosophy, 93 KY. L.J. 305, 309 (2004-2005).
206. See generally Henry Shea, Top 10 List: Lessons Learned From White-Collar Crimi-
nals, ST. THOMAS LAWYER, available at http://www.stthomas.edu/lawmagazine/2008/winter/
topl0list.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
207. Dickman, supra note 205, at 1707.
2011]
29
Clermont: It's Never Too Late to Make Amends: Two Wrongs Don't Protect a Vi
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
392 NOVA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 35
sue the slippery slope of the redolent path returning to victim-centric ap-
proach of yore, where will we stop? The Constitution will become meaning-
less if Congress lacks the political courage to draw the line when remedies
like restitution erode the protections of the Bill of Rights as well as the Due
Process Clause. The High Court does no better when it engages in activism.
If we are going to move towards the past, perhaps it is time we start to care-
fully scrutinize which past we choose.
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